Stock Price Dynamics in

Introduction
In the recent past, finance scholars have made a number of striking observations with regard to both micro level individual investor behavior as well as macro level stock market dynamics.
With regard to micro level individual investor behavior, behavioral finance research reported on the effect of phenomena such as frame-dependence, heuristic driven bias, mental-accounting, herding, and investors' variety of preferences on the decision-making behavior of these investors. For an introductory overview of the behavioral finance literature, we refer to e.g., Nofsinger (2002) , Schleifer (2000) , Shefrin (2002 ), or Shiller (2005 . In addition to these findings, the results of our empirical studies as discussed in the previous two chapters have shown that apart from financially oriented needs, individual investors sometimes also try to satisfy more socially oriented needs. When investors try to satisfy needs that are more socially oriented, their decision-making behavior may also become more socially oriented and the level of social interaction amongst investors can be expected to increase. Moreover, in these instances, investors may also be more inclined to use the investing behavior of other investors as an input for their own decision-making or on occasions they may even simply copy other investors' behavior (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Hirschleifer, 1993; Mangleburg et al., 2004; Suls et al., 2002 ). Yet, this does not imply that investors' socially oriented decision-making may only originate from the importance that these investors attribute to their social needs. Feelings of uncertainty may also be an important driver of this behavior. In general, it has been found that when people are uncertain as to what action to take or feel to have a lack knowledge and experience relevant for a certain task, the observed behavior of those around them becomes an important input for their own decision-making (DiMaggio & Louch, 1998; Festinger, 1954; Jones & Gerard, 1967) . This socially oriented decisionmaking may occur in social networks that connect friends with friends of friends and so on (Janssen & Jager, 2003; Watts, 2001; Watts & Strogatz, 1998) .
Recent research on these (social) networks has demonstrated that many large networks display a scale-free power-law distribution for node connectivity (Barabasi & Albert, 1999) . This implies that there are many persons with only a few links to others and only a few persons with many links to others. In the before-mentioned literature, these heavily connected persons are called 'hubs' and in terms of market dynamics, the existence of such hubs may imply that a small proportion of investors having many contacts may have an exceptional influence on the investing behavior of many other investors. As was argued in the introduction of this thesis, herding may be an ultimate result of the socially inspired decision-making behavior of individual investors and is considered one of the driving forces behind excessive stock market price movements like hypes, crashes and bubbles (Lynch, 2001; Ofek, 2003; Sharma et al., 2005; Valliere & Peterson, 2004) . In this chapter, it is hypothesized that the larger the proportion of investors who exhibit socially oriented decision-making, the larger will be the odds for chaotic stock market dynamics, which can contribute to more frequent observations of the striking stock market phenomena that will be discussed in the next two paragraphs.
With regard to macro level stock market dynamics, a distinction can be made between observations of extreme stock market phenomena and observations of less extreme stock market phenomena. Perhaps the most salient example of an extreme stock market phenomenon is the late 1990's Internet bubble which severely disturbed financial markets all over the world. Throughout the years, different authors have presented possible explanations for this bubble. Shefrin (2002), for example, investigated the role of initial underpricing of Internet IPO's (Initial Public Offerings), long-term underperformance due to initial overshooting of the fundamental value, and hot-issue markets. Bhattacharya et al. (2004) have studied the role of the media, while Valliere and Peterson (2004) focused on groupthink as a possible explanation for the Internet bubble. Although many scholars at least seem to agree that the extreme inflation of stock prices as 75 illustrated by figure 4.1 was partly due to the irrational exuberance of some investors (Shiller, 2005) , no single study managed to present an all-encompassing explanation for this phenomenon. Figure 4 .1 shows the weekly price index of the Dutch stock market AEX from January 1997 until December 2002. We have used weekly data to avoid problems of missing data due to weekends, holidays, and other special occasions. We would like to note that as the AEX contains both technology as well as non-technology stocks, the spike in stock prices for this index can be considered as relatively mild in comparison to more technologyheavy indices like for example the NASDAQ. Less extreme stock market phenomena have been studied under the heading of stylized financial market facts and include phenomena such as autocorrelation, volatility clustering, and heavy tails in the (un)conditional asset returns distributions (Cont, 2001) . In the following, we will briefly discuss these phenomena and illustrate them for the Dutch stock market AEX, again for the period from January 1997 until December 2002.
In liquid markets, there will be no significant linear autocorrelation in both price increments and asset returns (Fama, 1970; Pagan, 1996) . This absence of autocorrelation means that it is impossible to consistently achieve positive expected earnings with a simple strategy of statistical arbitrage (Cont, 2001: 229) . In this situation, an investor cannot be expected to be able to predict the future's stock prices or asset returns using historical stock prices or asset returns data. This can also be seen as support for the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1991) . However, it has been proven too that when we increase the time scale on which the linear autocorrelation is measured, the absence of autocorrelation does not systematically hold anymore. It has for example been found that weekly and monthly returns do exhibit autocorrelation (Cont, 2001) . To illustrate these findings, figure 4.2 shows the autocorrelation graph of the weekly returns for the Dutch stock market AEX for the period from January 1997 until December 2002. As can be seen in this figure, these weekly returns do exhibit significant autocorrelation for several lags. Yet, even if asset returns do not display linear autocorrelation, this does not mean that they are independent random variables. Independence means that any nonlinear function of asset returns will also display no autocorrelation. The latter condition, however, does not hold. Simple, non-linear functions of asset returns, as for example the squared or absolute returns, often display significant positive autocorrelation or 'persistence'. This characteristic is indicative for a phenomenon that is called 'volatility clustering ' (Cont, 2001) . Volatility clustering is a description for the tendency of large positive or negative changes of asset prices and returns to be followed by large changes and small changes to be followed by small changes. That is, current levels of volatility tend to be positively correlated with the level of volatility in immediately previous periods (Brooks, 2004) . In table 4.1, we present the outcomes of a test in finance that is commonly used to detect volatility persistence or 'volatility clustering', namely the (Generalized) ARCH test. 2 Again, we have used weekly data for the period from January 1997 until December 2002. A very typical pattern observed for asset returns is that the coefficients on all three terms in the conditional variance equation are highly statistical significant, with a small value for the variance intercept term C, a somewhat larger ARCH term, and an even larger GARCH term. The ARCH term represents the lagged squared error, while the GARCH term represents the lagged conditional variance. Both terms summed together are generally found to be close to 1 (unity). The latter indicates that shocks to the conditional variance will be highly persistent, i.e. there is volatility persistence or volatility clustering. As can be seen in table 4.1, the weekly returns of the Dutch stock market AEX display volatility clustering in a similar fashion as worldwide stock markets in general do. That is, the variance intercept term C is small, the ARCH term is larger and the GARCH term is even larger than the ARCH term. Moreover, summed together, these three values are close to 1 (unity). Heavy (or 'fat') tails (indicated by a kurtosis higher than 3, which can be observed for a normal distribution) are one characteristic of a leptokurtic distribution that is characteristic for asset returns and which has both heavier tails as well as a more peaked mean than a normally distributed random variable with the same mean and variance (Brooks, 2004) . Sometimes, even after correcting returns for volatility clustering, using e.g., GARCH-like models, the residual time series exhibit heavy tails. However, these tails are normally less heavy than those of the unconditional distribution of asset returns (Cont, 2001 ). In figure 4 .3, the weekly unconditional returns distribution of the Dutch stock market AEX is displayed for the period from January 1997 until December 2002. The kurtosis of 5.62 indicates that similar to most international stock markets this distribution shows heavy tails. As expressed in the second research objective and the second and third research question of this thesis, we aim to contribute to a better understanding of the possible effects of micro level investor behavior on macro level stock market dynamics. Yet, the interactions between the micro and the macro level are often nonlinear and macro level outcomes -such as crashes, hypes, and bubbles -may sometimes 'emerge' (Arthur, 1995; Lewin, 1999; Waldrop, 1992) . Multi-agent social simulation is a particularly appropriate tool in helping to explain the complex interactions between the micro and macro level (Gilbert & Troitzsch, 1999) .
In this chapter we will re-formalize an existing model on investor behavior in a multi-agent social simulation environment. The model that will be used is the well-cited model of Day and Huang (1990) . In this model, a distinction can be made between investors that are predominantly interested in the fundamental characteristics of a share and investors whose decision-making behavior is more socially oriented. These characteristics of the model make it a particularly appropriate model to investigate the effect of changing proportions of socially oriented investors on the stock market dynamics. When studying these stock market dynamics, our main focus will be on the price and returns dynamics and to a lesser extent on the occurrence of the before discussed stylized financial market facts. In chapter 5, more attention will be paid to the occurrence of stylized financial market facts in simulated returns time series.
The remainder of this chapter is organized in the following way. In section 4.2, we will more extensively discuss the original model specification of Day and Huang (1990) . Sections 4.3 through 4.7 will present the results of five different simulation experiments, while section 4.8 concludes and discusses opportunities for future research.
The Simulation Model
The original specification of the model by Day and Huang (1990) distinguishes three types of market participants. These are alpha-investors, beta-investors, and the market maker, respectively. In the next three sections, we will discuss the behavior of each of these groups in a more detailed way.
The Alpha Investor
The α-investor uses a strategy based on an independent, sophisticated estimate of the long run investment value u in relation to the current market price p and on an estimate of the probability of capital gains and capital losses. The investment value u is the α-investor's best estimate of the price if anticipated long run economic conditions actually came to dominate the future. It is based on e.g., statistical analyses of trends in aggregate economic variables and individual company performances. These quantitative estimates are then adjusted with the help of 'soft' judgments based on e.g., journals, papers, magazines and direct company observations. The excess demand function of α-investors therefore is:
Formally we have:
The positive parameter 'a' is a measure of the strength of investor demand. It reflects the fact as expressed by Black (1986) that the more the price of a stock deviates from its long run investment value, the more aggressive the information traders become. Day and Huang (1990) set the value of this parameter to 0.2.
f (p) is a weighting function that represents the chance of lost opportunity caused by either failing to buy when the market is low or failing to sell when the market is high. When p is close to m, the chance of missing a capital gain by failing to buy is great, when p is close to M, the chance of losing a capital gain and experiencing a capital loss by failing to sell is great as well. When p is close to u, the perceived chance of capital gain or capital loss is small or zero. So, f (.) is bimodal with modes near or at m and M. Formally stated:
f' (p) > 0 for u < p < M (4.15)
The Beta Investor
The β-investors, similar to Blacks' (1986) 'noise traders' do not pursue the same sophisticated techniques as the α-investors do, as this kind of trading is expensive. It takes a lot of time, costly information and a substantial investment in intellectual and computational capital. Most market participants therefore cannot afford to pursue this kind of behavior and consequently they don't (Day & Huang, 1990) . Rather, the β-strategy suggests a more socially oriented investment behavior. The β-investors make their decisions using a simple comparison between the current price p and a given current fundamental value, v. β-investors buy when they expect an upward price trend (whenever the current price p is above a given current fundamental value v that initially equals u) and sell when they expect a downward price trend (whenever p is below v). This simple kind of behavior has some similarity to herding behavior (Banerjee & Fudenberg, 2004; Bikhchandani & Sharma, 2000; Cont & Bouchaud, 2000; De Bondt & Forbes, 1999; Hirschleifer & Teoh, 2003; Lux, 1995; Orlean, 1989; Scharfstein & Stein, 1990) .
After a number of simplifications, Day and Huang (1990) arrive at the following excess demand function for β-investors:
The coefficient b reflects the relative importance of β-investors and the strength of their response to price signals. Day and Huang (1990) set the value of this parameter to 0.88.
The Market Maker
The third participant in the market is the market maker. This party functions as a mediator between transactions on the market and sets a price according to the excess demand or excess supply that can be observed in the market. At this price the market maker satisfies the excess demand from his inventory of stocks or increases his inventory of stocks to absorb an excess supply.
The total excess demand E is the combined excess demand of the α-investors and the β-investors :
If V t is the market makers' inventory of stocks at the time he or she announces the price, then the change in inventory is: Initially, the value of the parameter c is set to 1 in Day and Huang (1990).
Simulation Experiment 1
In the original model by Day and Huang (1990) , an investor will either be an α-investor or a β-investor. In reality, it seems more likely that in some circumstances an investor's behavior will show more similarity to that of an α-investor and in other circumstances an investor's behavior shows more similarity to that of a β-investor. Stock markets and stocks alike may differ to the extent that investors focus more on fundamental characteristics of a share like price/earnings ratios or beta's (like α-investors may do) or focus more on social aspects of a share like information about which shares friends, colleagues or prominent finance experts buy (like β-investors may be more inclined to do). To acknowledge these differences between investors, we re-formalized the model by Day and Huang (1990) in a multi-agent social simulation context and introduced a new parameter S. The extent to which each investor follows either an α-strategy or a β-strategy is now weighted by this parameter that represents the social susceptibility of an investor. That is, in our multi-agent social simulation model formalization of this model, an agent can use only an α-strategy, only a β-strategy, or any possible mixture between these two strategies. In other words, investors are heterogeneous with regard to the strategies they follow.
Introducing the parameter S leads to the following simple formula 3 for the total excess demand as based on Day and Huang (1990):
In the remainder of this section, we will investigate the effect of changing proportions of socially oriented investors on the stock market price dynamics, expecting to see more chaotic stock market price dynamics when the level of S is increased.
In experiment 1.1 we show that when S is very low or close to zero, representative for a situation in which fundamental traders dominate the market, the market prices stabilize and remain at a constant level after only a small number of time steps. This is caused by the alpha-investors who constantly try to trade in a way that brings the price back to its long-run investment value. Yet, we can observe that this equilibrium price is higher than both the starting price and the long-run investment value. So, although with these low values of S, the β-investors did not succeed in pushing the market out of equilibrium into a more chaotic price behavior, these investors did induce an upward shock. In figure 4 .4, we further illustrate these findings of experiment 1.1 by presenting an example of the price dynamics (with p = 0.501; u = 0.500; S = 0.03 and 10 agents). In experiment 1.2 we separately increased the value of S (i.e. the weighting of the β-strategy) as well as the number of agents, which both resulted in more chaotic stock market price dynamics as can also be observed in real stock markets. In figure 4 .5, we present an example of the price dynamics for this second series of experiments (with p = 0.501; u = 0.500; S = 0.02 and 100 agents). Durbin-Watson tests and GARCH analysis indicated both autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity to be present in the returns series from this series of experiments. Both effects can also be observed in real-life stock market returns. In experiment 1.3, we further increased the weighting of the β-strategy over certain boundaries, which lead to very excessive stock market price dynamics. In these situations, the stock market price dynamics become so extreme, that we had to instruct the computer to stop the simulation. This is visible in figure 4 .6 (where we used p = 0.501; u = 0.500; S = 0.100 and 100 agents) by the absence of price developments after a short period of very volatile stock price dynamics. 
Simulation Experiment 2
In experiment 1.3, after only a minor increase in the level of S, the price time series already became excessively volatile. A persistent problem in the first simulation experiment therefore was that the parameter space for which useful price time series could be obtained like those of experiment 1.2 (see figure 4.5) was very small. This problem was due to the fact, that in the original model by Day and Huang (1990) , all investors made their decisions to buy, sell or hold at exactly the same moment in time.
In experiment 2.1 we attempt to increase the parameter space by changing this 'simultaneous market updating mechanism' into a 'sequential market updating mechanism' and to observe the market dynamics that result from this model modification. In the sequential market updating formalization, a random process is responsible for the order in which the investors are selected to make their decisions to trade. After each individual trade has taken place, the market is cleared and a new market price is calculated. Then, another investor trades, reacting partly to the trades of previous investors, as the price has now probably changed, and again the market is cleared.
In experiment 2.2, we moreover performed a number of experiments with homogenous and heterogeneous investor populations in combination with the sequential market updating mechanism. In experiments 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3, the investor population was homogeneous. That is, S was set at a certain value and this value was the same for all investors. In experiment 2.2, however, we will introduce heterogeneity by not using one fixed average value of S, but using a range of randomly generated values of S to lie within 0 and a set value. This situation would represent the actual market situation in a more realistic way, as it is a well-known fact that not all investors follow exactly the same strategy. Although this setting eventually results in the same average S for the experiment as when directly setting S at a certain average value, we expect different market dynamics, as the investor population now doesn't react in exactly the same way to price changes.
In experiment 2.1, investors are still homogeneous, that is, they all have the same value of S. In this case, the market price always reaches equilibrium. No matter how strong the β-strategy is, the α-strategy is always able to bring the market back to equilibrium, though the market price ends at a higher level than it started. The price level at which an equilibrium is reached depends on the value of S. Higher values of S lead to equilibria at higher levels, as the greater proportion of socially oriented investors with trend following behavior drives up market prices. In figure  4 .7, the price developments for a number of different levels of S are presented (with p = 0.501; u = 0.500 and 100 agents). As mentioned above, in experiment 2.2, the investors are heterogeneous, with every investor having a different value for S. This setting leads to a change in the before discussed stock market price dynamics. Now, the price developments only become chaotic when the β-strategy is strong enough, that is, at higher levels of S. At relatively low levels of S, the price still reaches equilibrium. In figure 4 .8, we report on the price developments that result from three different settings of S. In the first setting S was randomly assigned between 0.0 and 1, in the second setting it was randomly assigned between 0.4 and 1, and in the third setting it was randomly assigned between 0.5 and 1. 
Simulation Experiment 3
In the previous section, we applied a sequential market updating mechanism to increase the parameter space for which useful price time series could be obtained. Although this modification to the model was effective in enlarging this parameter space, chaotic like stock market dynamics could now only be observed for heterogeneous investor populations. To overcome this limitation of the model, a more elaborate mechanism to enlarge the parameter space was required.
We therefore decided to bound the total excess demand between the previously described bottoming (m) and topping (M) prices of 0.0 and 1.0 using an exponential transformation (see equation 4.22). Day and Huang (1990) have avoided these problems of a limited parameter size by only reporting on a model parameterization that caused the market price dynamics to remain between the bounds of 0.0 and 1.0.
Here γ represents how strongly the market reacts to investors' actions. This parameter γ is comparable to the price adjustment coefficient c as used by Day and Huang (1990) .
In experiment 3.1 and 3.2, we studied the influence of changing levels of trend following versus fundamental investors on the stock market price dynamics as in the experiment series 1 and 2. Moreover, we now also observed the effect of changing proportions of the socially oriented investors on the volatility of the overall stock market returns. In experiment 3.1, the level of socially oriented trend following investors is uniformly distributed between 0.10 and 0.12, resulting in an average level of trend following investors of 0.11. In experiment 3.2, the level of socially oriented trend following investors is uniformly distributed between 0.1 and 0.5, resulting in an average level of trend following investors of 0.3. In both experiments, the starting price p is 0.501, the long run investment value u and the current fundamental value v are both 0.500, and there are 100 investing agents.
In figure 4.9 and 4.10, we present both the price and returns time series for experiment 3.1. In figure 4 .11 and 4.12, we present these results for experiment 3.2. The results of 100 time steps were subsequently studied and it was found that with lower proportions of trend following investors (as in experiment 3.1), the standard deviation of returns is much smaller than with larger proportions of trend following investors (as in experiment 3.2). In experiment 3.1, the standard deviation of returns was 0.09, while in experiment 3.3, this standard deviation was larger at a value of 1.1. Again, this result indicates that social interaction amongst investors may lead to an increased level of stock market volatility, as measured by the standard deviation of the returns. This is intuitive in the sense that if an increasing number of investors rely on a social strategy to make their investment decisions, it becomes more likely that herding behavior, the corresponding stock market price inflation, and an increased level of stock market volatility occurs. Moreover, it can be seen in figure 4.11 that a higher proportion of socially oriented investors results in an initial upward price swing. All in all, the results of the modified model confirm the results of the previous experiments.
A comparison of the kurtosis of the returns distributions of these experiments with those that can be observed in real stock markets showed that the results of the current experiments do not yet replicate the heavy or 'fat' tails that can be observed in real markets. The kurtosis of experiment 3.1 was only 1.98, while the kurtosis of experiment 3.2 was somewhat larger at 2.40.
Simulation Experiment 4
On the individual level, the behavior of the investors is driven by the parameter S. However, the behavior of investors must not necessarily be the same in all circumstances. Investors might change their S according to their feelings and their fears (see equation 4.23). We therefore decided to design a switching mechanism in the investors' strategies where we formalize the changes in S as a combination of the agent's confidence coming from his or her previous returns and fear coming from the deviation of the current price from the fundamental or long-run investment value. The returns are derived from an estimation of how good individual investor agents have forecasted the price for the next period, better forecasts implying superior returns (see equation 4.24). Investors with higher returns are expected to feel more confident. The more the current price deviates from the fundamental value, the higher the fear of investors that the stock price developments might reverse, possibly leading to losses for these investors. Therefore, at certain moments in time, trend following investors may decide to return to a more 'rational' or fundamental's based strategy.
This adaptation of the model (the addition of a switching mechanism in the investors' strategy) also addresses the weak point of the standard model as identified more generally in Arthur (1995) . This is that the market dynamics are generated by the actions of the investors, but the cognition of the investors is not affected by the evolution of the market. It should be noted that the only parameter that is introduced in comparison to the previous formalization of the model is δ. This is the individual tendency of investors to become afraid. When this tendency is higher, investors will more quickly develop feelings of fear in case the current price deviates from the fundamental value. We interpret this parameter as the speed of the investors' reactions to changes in the price relative to the fundamental or long-run investment value. We can fix δ for every investors or we can distribute it in a uniform way (e.g., δ = [0.0, 1.0]).
In the following experiments, the influence of two different levels of the parameter δ on the stock market price and returns dynamics will be studied. In both experiments, the initial proportion of trend following investors is 0.11, the starting price p is 0.501, the long run investment value u and the current fundamental value v are both 0.500, and there are 100 investor agents. We subsequently studied the results for 100 time steps.
In experiment 4.1, the value of δ is 0.5 and in experiment 4.2, the value of δ is 1.0. When we compare the volatility of the stock market as measured by the standard deviation of returns between experiment 4.1 and 4.2, we find that higher levels of 'fear' in the investor population can be associated with greater stock market volatility. In experiment 4.1 (with δ = 0.5), we find a standard deviation of returns of 0.44, while in experiment 4.2 (with δ = 1.0), we find a standard deviation of returns of 0.50. Apparently, the higher probability of investors to switch between investment strategies caused more turbulent stock market dynamics in the second experiment.
Moreover, it was found that when investors have a higher initial individual tendency to become afraid (indicated by a higher level of δ), the risk of previous periods becomes less important for the risk of today, as measured by ARCH 4 and GARCH 5 effects. The ARCH term represents the lagged squared error, while the GARCH term represents the lagged conditional variance. In tables 4.2 and 4.3, the ARCH and GARCH effects are displayed in the conditional variance equations for experiment 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. When investors react more fiercely to deviations of the current price from the current fundamental value, and therefore switch more easily from a trend following to a more fundamental or 'rational' strategy, the market displays less volatility clustering.
Lastly, in contrast to the results reported for the previous experiments, the returns distributions of both experiments showed somewhat heavy or 'fat' tails as indicated by the kurtosis of 3.74 of experiment 4.1 and 3.39 of experiment 4.2. Yet, these tails are less heavy than those that can be found in real stock markets. 4 ARCH is the test for conditional heteroscedasticity as developed by Engle (1982) . 5 GARCH is the generalized model for conditional heteroscedasticity as developed independently by Bollerslev (1986) and Taylor (1986). 
Simulation Experiment 5
In the previous experiments, we investigated the effect of different proportions of socially oriented trend following investors on the overall stock market dynamics. Yet, we did not study the individual returns achieved by the different types of investors and in what situations it may pay to be either a socially oriented trend following or a fundamentals based 'rational' investor. In experiment 5, the returns for each individual agent in the agent population as aggregated over 500 time steps of the simulation were therefore calculated using equation 4.26, resulting in 100 observations (one for each agent). Also, for each agent, the level of S was recorded. Scatter plots of the relationship between the level of S and the returns were made for two situations; a situation with a lower average level of S and a situation with a higher average level of S. In experiment 5.1, S was set as a uniform distribution between 0.01 and 0.21, resulting in an average level of S of 0.11. In experiment 5.2, S was set as a uniform distribution between 0.1 and 0.5, resulting in the higher average level of S of 0.3. This experimental design leads to the observation of the following phenomena.
In stock markets that are dominated by 'rational' investors using a fundamental strategy as in experiment 5.1, investors with higher levels of S achieve higher returns than investors with lower levels of S. So, in these markets it is beneficial to be a socially oriented trend following investor, and these investors can be said to be 'free-riding' on the fundamental investors. In figure 4 .17, this relationship has been plotted. However, in markets with a higher average level of trend following investors, as in experiment 5.2, a more complex pattern emerges. In these markets, the relationship between the level of S and the individual returns follows a flattened U-shape, as can be seen in figure 4.18. In this market, investors with relatively low levels of S achieve high returns, and so do investors with relatively high levels of S. Investors with intermediate levels of S are proverbially 'stuck in the middle', as they earn lower returns than both of these other two groups of investors do. So, in this market an investor should either be a pronounced 'rational' investor following a fundamental strategy or a pronounced socially oriented trend following investor in order to obtain high returns. Overall, the returns are higher in experiment 5.2 than they are in experiment 5.1. 
Conclusion and Discussion
In this chapter we have investigated the effect of micro level investor behavior on macro level stock market dynamics and a possible feedback effect from macro level stock market dynamics on micro level individual investor behavior.
More specifically, we investigated the effect of changing proportions of socially oriented trend following investors on the overall stock market dynamics. Moreover, we have studied the possible effects of overall stock market dynamics on individual investor behavior through an elaborate switching mechanism that allowed investors to switch from a socially oriented trend following investment strategy to a more fundamentals based 'rational' strategy when they become afraid that the current stock market price developments might reverse. Furthermore, we have studied in what market situations a socially oriented investment strategy could be more or less appropriate in terms of individual investors' returns.
We have found that increasing the proportion of socially oriented investors leads to more chaotic, volatile stock market price and returns dynamics.
Moreover, we have found that higher levels of 'fear' in the investor population can be associated with greater stock market volatility as measured by the standard deviation of the overall stock market returns.
Furthermore, it has been found that in stock markets that are dominated by 'rational' investors using fundamental strategies, it is beneficial to use a socially oriented trend following strategy, while in markets with a higher average level of trend following investors, a more complex pattern emerges. In these markets, an investor should either follow a pronounced fundamental strategy or a pronounced socially oriented trend following strategy in order to obtain high returns To obtain these results, Day and Huang's (1990) model on investor behavior was re-formalized in a multi-agent social simulation environment. Moreover, in the course of this chapter, several modifications to the original model specification were made to improve both its relevance and usability.
Yet, even the current model formalization has a number of limitations, which justified the development of a more realistic multi-agent social simulation model of investor behavior that will be presented in the next chapter.
First, in traditional models like the model by Day and Huang (1990) , agents only interact through market prices. There are no more elaborate processes of social interactions taking place amongst traders. Although in general these traditional models have been able to explain unpredictable asset prices and returns, they have difficulty in explaining the other stylized facts as identified in e.g., Brock (1997) . Also the results obtained by the modified model by Day and Huang (1990) showed only limited agreement with the several stylized financial market facts that can be found in real stock markets as discussed in the introduction of this chapter. Although the returns time series showed a small amount of volatility clustering and the returns distribution had somewhat heavy tails, there still is a gap to be bridged in terms of agreement between real-life results and simulated results.
Moreover, the traditional view of financial markets from which these type of models on investor behavior historically stem, has recently become challenged by developments in bounded rationality (see e.g., Sargent (1993)), behavioral finance (see e.g., Barberis and Thaler (2003) ) and computational agent-based modeling (see e.g., Tesfatsion and Judd (2006) ). Yet, even the more recent models have one important limitation. This is that their agent trading and interaction rules are often overly simple and remote from those as applied by real-life investors.
In the next chapter, we will present a model on investor behavior that takes the limitations of this chapter's model into account. Most importantly, this model, called SimStockExchange™, uses more realistic agent rules that are derived from the empirical studies of which the results were reported in chapters 2 and 3. Moreover, SimStockExchange allows for far more elaborate processes of social interaction to take place amongst investors.
